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WATCH COMMITTEE
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. ~~REPORTED COMMUNIST EXPECTATION OF OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR:~~ A series of recent reports, most of which have been received from [redacted] have contained references to a Chinese Communist and North Korean expectation, expressed at high level conferences, that the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty on 4 September will be the start of World War III. [redacted]

The reports may be plants or fabrications, but it is also possible that they are substantially correct versions of meetings actually held. In the latter case, however, the views expressed may be only those of the Chinese Communists and North Koreans and not necessarily those of the Soviets as well. There have been numerous indications of the concern with which the Communists view the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, but it is not believed that the U.S.S.R. would start World War III over the Peace Treaty alone. Even if the reports are authentic, they might mean no more than a Chinese Communist evaluation that the signing of the Treaty would make World War III inevitable rather than that it would be the signal for the commencement of hostilities.

2. ~~KOREA:~~ A very high level of vehicle sightings during the week, heavier enemy artillery fire and the observation of tank tracks point to a continuing build-up of the enemy capability for a resumption of the offensive. The Communists now are estimated to be capable logistically of sustaining a 14-day attack, which could be launched with minimum warning. Various reports have stated that the enemy offensive is to be resumed between mid-August and early September and some reports have indicated that Communist preparations are scheduled for completion in August. Enemy night air activity continues on a small scale and may include Chinese Communist as well as North Korean aircraft. Operation of enemy jets from bases in North Korea is possible but is not confirmed. The establishment of a training center for jet pilots in Manchuria has been reported. Communist propaganda continues adamant on the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line.

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3. **CHINA:** The estimated strength of the CCAF has been increased from 1000 to approximately 1100 aircraft as the result of cumulative evidence of the establishment of a conventional LA-11 fighter regiment at Enshan, and the presence of two possibly new jet fighter regiments at Tsingtao and possibly another light bomber regiment in the Shanghai area. A recent report further indicates the likelihood that the Chinese Communists are being trained in submarine operations and may operate small submarines in the near future.
4. **INDOCHINA:** The reorganization of major Viet Minh units continues and a new infantry division has been identified. This division, which has recently received equipment, will be capable of launching attacks in Annam in the very near future. There are continuing indications that the Chinese Communists are supplying substantial amounts of equipment to the Viet Minh and are pushing completion of transportation facilities to the Indochina border. There are slight indications of Viet Minh preparations for air activity. A major Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina does not appear to be imminent.
5. **GERMANY-AUSTRIA:** Soviet troop arrivals in Germany since 1 January are now estimated to have exceeded departures by 69,000, and there is a possibility that the net increase may be in excess of 100,000. It appears increasingly likely that a planned augmentation of Soviet troop strength has been under way. Such a move, which would raise the strength of units above their normal peacetime strength of 70% of T/O, may be intended to offset the increase in Western troop strength in Germany. There has been no significant change in Soviet field training in Germany, but the emphasis on river-crossing exercises, particularly along the Elbe, continues. The Soviet jet training program is progressing in Austria.
6. **SATELLITES:** Greatly increased air activity, including jet aircraft, in the Budapest area and increased appearances of Hungarian Air Force personnel at a Soviet Airfield in Budapest provide further substantiation that the Hungarian Air Force is being trained in jet aircraft. An unconfirmed report indicates the possibility that the first four units of the East German Air Force are to be activated by October 1951. There are indications that the strength of Hungarian Army units is to be increased this fall and that older age groups were inducted in late July and early August for short periods of refresher training. The bulk of Rumania's armored division has returned to Bucharest. There are indications of Soviet concern with the situation in Poland, and the present purge trial is being used to intensify propaganda against the West.
7. **GENERAL:** Soviet propaganda continues unchanged in its anti-American tone and the reply of President Shvernik to President Truman merely reiterates old themes of the "peace campaign." Western European Communist Parties are reportedly planning to intensify their propaganda and labor agitation during September and October, with emphasis on strikes and sabotage in Western European ports.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with little or no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. In Korea, the Communists have continued to improve their capabilities for the resumption of the offensive and there is no indication in their propaganda that they will modify their position with respect to the demarcation line.
3. Further major Chinese Communist military operations, other than in Korea, do not appear to be imminent but the modernization and reequipping of the Chinese armed forces continues. Preparations for possible increased support of the Viet Minh are continuing.
4. There are no firm indications of Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities in Europe or the Near East or to extend the area of conflict in the Far East in the immediate future. The Soviet Union, however, may consider the present period to be unusually critical and to call for major decisions with respect to future Soviet policy. Soviet troop strength in Germany has increased while military preparations in Korea continue, and there have been various reports that the month of September may mark a turning point in Communist policy or may be the time for some new political or military move.

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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. ANALYSIS OF REPORTS REFERRING TO IMMINENT OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR.

(1) The following is a further analysis of several recent reports which contain references to the start of World War III in connection with the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty on 4 September 1951. Much of this information was discussed in less detail in Watch Committee Report No. 52. The various reports have included the following:

(a) On 8 May 1951, Soviet, Chinese Communist and North Korean officials, and former Japanese army officers met in Mukden to discuss a future invasion of Japan. Among those present were Mao Tse-tung, Kim Il-sung, one "Marinshikov" (phonetic), Chief Soviet advisor to the CCF, and various Japanese officers. Mao and Kim reportedly insisted that an attack should be launched against Japan after the Peace Treaty is signed. It was further agreed that a Soviet Puppet force should be used in the operation against Japan. Included in this force would be 2,500 former Japanese Army personnel reportedly trained as parachute troops at Chiamussu, Manchuria. According to another report, a meeting of high Chinese and Soviet personnel in Peiping in May reached decisions to oppose a Japanese Peace Treaty and delay cease-fire negotiations as long as possible in order to prepare for World War III.

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- (d) On 23 July, Siao Ka arrived in Pyongyang and met with Peng Teh-huai and Kim Il-sung.

- (e) On 25 July, a meeting was held in Peiping attended by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and other Chinese Communist leaders at which it was decided that: the Chinese Communists should agree to a cease-fire if the conditions that existed before 25 June 1950 could be obtained; the U.S. signing of the Japanese peace treaty on 4 September will probably be the start of World War III; the U.S. is already prepared for World War and probably is making unreasonable demands and violating international agreements in order to start World War III; an "announcement by General Marshall" that the U.S. has already agreed to the withdrawal of all troops from Korea and that the Chinese Communists are to be one of the nations to review the cease-fire was judged as an indication that the U.S. does not want the Chinese Communists as an enemy in World War III, and inclusion of Communist China among the nations reviewing the cease-fire constitutes U.S. recognition of Communist China; the Chinese Communists should attempt to stop the Korean war and must have time to prepare for defense.

- (f) On 1 August, a meeting was held in Pyongyang attended by Kim Il-sung, Peng Teh-huai, various other North Korean and Chinese Communist officials, and Soviet Lieutenant General Dcrevyanko. At this meeting it was decided that: North Korea desires the chance to prepare for world war but will agree to a cease-fire if assurances are received that the U.S. does not intend to invade them; it is important for China to save face with the countries which are supporting her but if she cannot do so she will have to continue fighting until World War III starts; the war in Korea is really the beginning of World War III which will start in earnest very soon.

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- (5) References in the reports to World War III beginning with the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty may have been intended to mean nothing more than that the treaty would make World War III inevitable rather than that the signing of the treaty would be the signal for the immediate beginning of hostilities. There have been abundant indications of the grave concern with which the Soviets and the Chinese Communists view the contemplated peace treaty with Japan and the subsequent rearmament of Japan in some form, but it is not believed that the Soviets would start World War III over the Japanese Peace Treaty alone. It must be fully recognized, however, that the Soviets have expressed themselves as being in unalterable opposition to "rearmament" by the West of both Germany and Japan.
- (6) The Soviets are considered to have the capabilities for initiating attacks in several critical areas, including Japan, but there is no positive information that they actually intend to exercise those capabilities in the near future, i.e., in September 1951.

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b. KOREA.

- (1) Ground. Front-line activity continued to be limited to patrol and probing actions but enemy activity was marked by stiffening resistance to U.N. probing in sensitive areas, notably greater artillery fire and front line reconnaissance. The filling in of tank traps, removal of obstacles, construction of bridges and sighting of tank tracks continue to indicate the enemy readiness for offensive action with little or no warning. Vehicular sightings, when weather conditions did not hinder reconnaissance, were extremely high, reaching a peak of 2060 on the night of 3-4 August, and it may be assumed that logistic and personnel supply was at a very high rate during the week. FECOM estimates that the enemy is now capable logistically of sustaining a 14-day attack, which could be launched with minimum warning. Various reports have placed the time of a renewed enemy offensive between the middle of August and early September. A report/

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states that all medical, surgical and ambulance corps assigned to the battle front must reach their designated battle stations before 10 August. A unit referred to as the "4th Wing" of the CCAF was also reportedly ordered to reach airfields in Manchuria before 4 August. A recent North Korean PM stated that the North Korean Army was critically short of weapons but that full reequipping and resupply from the U.S.S.R. were expected by the end of August and that units were then to be at full strength. The movement in mid-July of some 2000 paratroopers from Haifeng to Mukden has also been reported. One version of this report states that these troops were to proceed to the Korean border to join an "international brigade" under Soviet control. There is no other information to confirm such a movement, although Haifeng is a known paratroop training center. Estimated Chinese Communist strength in Korea has been reduced by 48,000 as the result of the dropping of the CCF 10th and 11th Armies from the Order of Battle, but there are continuing indications that other CCF units not presently accepted may actually be in Korea. Total enemy strength is now estimated at 510,000, including 236,000 North Koreans and 274,000 Chinese Communists.

- (2) Air. Night enemy air activity continues on a small scale with no firm evidence of the participation of enemy jets or of the location of bases from which the aircraft are operating. While it is possible that these aircraft are only those of the North Korean Air Force, there have been unconfirmed reports of night flying in Manchuria and, as reported last week, a Chinese Communist LA-11 fighter unit has been confirmed in southeastern Manchuria. The LA-11 has sufficient range to operate over all of Korea from

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Manchurian bases. There has been no confirmation that enemy jets are operating from North Korean bases. Some of the night intercepts by enemy aircraft, in view of the speed of these aircraft, may have been made by jets, however. A daylight attack against a British frigate off the west coast, not far from Kaesong, was reportedly made by a single engine jet aircraft which dropped one bomb. The capability of the MIG-15 to carry bombs has been confirmed by the discovery of bomb shackles on a recently captured MIG-15, and it thus appears that the MIG-15 is being employed as an offensive as well as defensive aircraft.

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- (3) Propaganda and Alleged Communist Intentions. There has been no change in the Communist propaganda line with respect to the cease-fire discussions. Communist statements continue to be adamant on the question of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and there have been some hints in the propaganda of the Communists that U.S. failure to accede to their position might lead to a breakdown of the discussions.

Reports of alleged plans of the Communists continue generally to be of low reliability and provide no firm basis for assessing their intentions. One report of possible significance in connection with other information indicating that September is to be an important month in Communist operations has been received, however. This information, purportedly emanating from a high-ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party, states that even if U.N. terms are completely unacceptable to the Chinese, they will find some formula for continuing discussions until September, when they "expect marked changes in the international situation."

c. JAPAN. Apart from the reports discussed above concerning alleged Communist plans in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty, there has been little information to indicate any new Communist move with respect to Japan.

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There continues to be no reliable evidence of a build-up of Soviet ground strength in the Far East, although an unconfirmed report this week states that Soviet troop strength at Vladivostok has recently increased.

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d. CHINA.

- (1) Air. Recent information establishes an increase in the estimated overall strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist Air Force. In addition to the IA-11 conventional fighter regiment recently identified at Anshan, there is evidence of the presence of two possibly new, although under strength, jet fighter regiments at Tsingtao, and possibly another TU-2 light bomber regiment in the Shanghai area. Therefore, the estimated total strength available to the CCAP has been increased from 1000 to approximately 1100 aircraft. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In June 1951 an airfield near Kalgan (100 miles northwest of Peiping) was under the command of a Soviet Air Force officer who is commander of the Soviet 19th Air Regiment. An undetermined number of aircraft, including jets, were on the field. A Chinese press report has also identified a Soviet unit at this field.

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e. INDOCHINA. Although Viet Minh operations continue on only a minor scale, the reorganization of major units is under way and a sixth Viet Minh infantry division has been identified. This division, designated as the 325th, has been in process of organization in Central Annam for over six months and some of its elements have recently been reequipped. The 325th Division is expected to be capable of launching attacks in Annam within two weeks or, in conjunction with the 304th Division, by the end of August or early September. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Reports meanwhile continue to indicate that the Chinese Communists are supplying substantial amounts of equipment to the Viet Minh and are pushing completion of transportation facilities to the Indochina border. One report that 100 trucks daily are crossing into Indochina from Hanning may indicate a more regular and possibly higher level of current supply to the Viet Minh than has been previously reported. An additional report on progress on the Hanning-Langson railway states that this line will soon be in operation. Reports that the Chinese Communists are also working on another rail line from Mengtze to Ho-kou (opposite Laokay) are inconclusive; this route is, however, currently being used for truck traffic.

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There continue to be no firm indications of Chinese Communist intentions to undertake a major intervention in Indochina in the near future. Two recent reports have stated, however, that the Chinese Communists plan to increase the scale of their "infiltration." One report states that 5,000 CCF troops are proceeding as "volunteers" to Viet Minh areas, and the other that the Chinese Communists have decided not to intervene overtly in Indochina but to continue their policy of "covert infiltration" up to a maximum of two regiments at one time.

25X1C Although no air activity has been noted to date on Viet Minh-held airfields, [redacted] the Viet Minh are maintaining an airstrip at Thanh Hoa (south of Hanoi) in operational condition, as well as several others in the North Delta area. [redacted] five fighters, allegedly assigned to the Viet Minh, and with one or two Viet Minh pilots, recently visited Mangtze Airfield in neighboring Yunnan Province.

25X1C f. BURMA. The Burmese Communists are maintaining, if not accelerating, the tempo of their attacks on communications in the Mandalay area and are continuing to move their strength northward. Burmese Government forces are over-extended, and troop movements to counter the border threat by the KMT have reduced the Government's capabilities in the Mandalay and oilfield areas.

g. INDONESIA. A 200-man dissident attack by Moslem fanatics and leftist bandits against a government post near Djakarta is a further indication of the deteriorating internal security situation in Indonesia. The appearance of Communist insignia along with Moslem emblems worn by the dissidents in this attack is an indication that Indonesian Communist Party efforts to bring the various dissident elements under its control have already achieved some success.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe.

a. GERMANY-AUSTRIA.

(1) Increase in Troop Strength. It is now estimated that troop arrivals in the Soviet Zone of Germany since 1 January aggregate some 120,000 while departures during the same period are estimated at 51,000, resulting in an apparent net gain of 69,000. The bulk of the troop movements occurred in June, and the major movement appears to have been concluded by 10 July. Departures probably are primarily members of the 1927 class returning to the Soviet Union for discharge, and it now appears that perhaps 75% of the troops of this class have left Germany. Arrivals are generally recruits of the 1931 class, although there have been slight indications that troops other than recruits have arrived in the Soviet Zone. [redacted]

[redacted] an additional net increase of 45,000 troops may have resulted from moves through Guben (a crossing point on the German-Polish border south of Frankfurt not normally utilized for troop shipments). Should this report prove to be correct, the total net increase of Soviet

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troops in Germany may be as much as 114,000. In any case, the total influx is larger than would be required to replace the entire 1927 class in Germany. While the increase may not be permanent, it appears possible that a planned augmentation of Soviet troop strength in Germany has been under way. A possible reason for the increase might be to raise the strength of units above the presently estimated strength of 70% of T/O or to offset the increase in Western troop strength in Germany.

- (2) Soviet Training. There have been no indications of any significant change in the pattern of Soviet field training in Germany. Training in various areas remains at about battalion level. Emphasis on river-crossing techniques continues and there appears to be a notable increase in the use of close support aircraft, including jets, in conjunction with ground force training. The Elbe River continues to be an important area for river crossing exercises. During the period of 15-17 July, timber was hauled to the Elbe at Magdeburg for the construction of bridge sections for pending maneuvers, and approximately 7,000 engineer troops are reported on the Elbe opposite Letzlinger Heide, near the reported location of the 10th Guards Tank Division.
- (3) Soviet Air Activity. Although no increase in strength has been noted in units of the 59th Tactical Air Army in Austria, there has been continued emphasis on flying training, with most units conducting formation flights on a regimental level. MIG-15 participation in air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery indicates further progress in the jet training program.

b. SATELLITES.

- (1) Air Activity. There are indications that Satellite air capabilities continue to be expanded. In Hungary, greatly increased air activity has been noted in the Budapest area involving jet fighter, attack and jet trainer aircraft. The increased appearance of Hungarian Air Force personnel at Budapest/Tokol (a Soviet Air Force field) and the recent appearance of MIG-15 trainer aircraft tend to substantiate previous reports that the Hungarian Air Force is receiving transition training in jet aircraft.

In Germany, according to an unconfirmed report, the first four units (Staffels) of the East German Air Police are to be activated by October 1951. The report states that the units will be subordinated organizationally to the Soviet Air Force and the aircraft will have Soviet markings. Previous reports have confirmed the existence of a headquarters of the East German Air Police, but no units are believed to have been organized.

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- (2) Hungarian Army. According to a Hungarian Army officer deserter, the Hungarian 4th Independent Rifle Division is due to expand to full strength by the autumn of 1951 and the present task of the division is to train reservists, which he estimated compose two-thirds of the division's present strength of 6000 men. This report appears generally reliable, although it is believed that the planned expansion may be only to 70% of the T/O of 10,000. The deserter's statement that the 1931 class will be called in the autumn is consistent with previous reports that elements of this class have been called and that the balance will probably be inducted this fall. Reliable observations indicate that some unusual induction activity occurred in Hungary recently, with the peak noted in Budapest on 1 August. Inductees up to the age of 30 include peasants as well as university students. This is probably the third increment called for the three-month refresher training program which began on 1 February 1951. Since Hungarian divisional maneuvers in the fall of 1950 reportedly were unsuccessful, it is believed that every effort is being made to show improvement in the fall maneuvers of 1951. Reports indicate that field exercises have been taking place since January of this year, and October is believed to have been chosen for the culmination of such activity. By that time these new inductees will probably have been trained sufficiently to participate in large-scale maneuvers.
- (3) Rumanian Army. Major elements of the Tudor Vladimirescu Armored Division are reported to have returned to Bucharest in late July, probably from the Rumanian Army's maneuver area west of Stalin (Brasov). So long as this division remains in Bucharest, it appears unlikely that the Rumanian Army will undertake any major military operations.
- (4) Poland. Recent developments suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be having considerable difficulty with Poland. Developments have included the mutiny and escape to Sweden by 12 members of the crew of a Polish minesweeper, the opening of the trial of nine Army and Navy Polish officers (including four generals), and the speeches of Soviet Vice-Premier Molotov and Marshal Zhukov in Warsaw. Molotov's speech, ostensibly threatening Tito, now seems to have been aimed primarily at Poland and other Satellites as a warning against "deviation." The trial of the nine officers, although undoubtedly designed to remove politically unreliable elements from the armed forces, also serves as a propaganda vehicle in the anti-West campaign. The Soviet press is giving the trial much space and is headlining it as the biggest purge trial since the 1949 Rajk trial in Hungary. The Polish officers are accused of being agents for the West, and the U.S. and other Western Powers have been accused of developing a "criminal, subversive and espionage organization within the Polish Armed Forces."


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3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. **PROPAGANDA.** Soviet propaganda has been marked by no new significant developments during the past week and remains predominantly anti-American in tone. Major effort continues to be devoted to the subversion of the Western Powers' mutual defense effort. Through a Satellite spokesman at the Berlin Youth Festival, the Soviets have reiterated their position on the dangers of West German rearmament, stating again that the "rebirth of German imperialism means war." Further support to resolutions adopted earlier at the World Peace Council is implicit in the proposal of Soviet President Shvernik to President Truman that a peace conference of the "Big Five" be convoked and in the calling of a hemispheric peace conference to take place in Mexico City in early September.

b. **COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITY.** There are indications of preparations by the Communist Parties of Western Europe, particularly those of France and Italy, to undertake additional programs to slow down defense preparations this fall. Members of the French and Italian Communist Parties reportedly are to discuss in August a large-scale program for a peace propaganda campaign and labor agitation to take place in both countries in September. At two meetings of Communist seamen and dockers held in July, one in Amsterdam and the other in Marseilles, strike and sabotage action involving all Western European ports and those of the entire Mediterranean basin was projected for September and October. During the past year there has been evidence of increasingly close cooperation among Western European Communist trade union leaders to retard defense preparations. This program has been abetted by their simultaneously pursuing a policy of greater "unity of action" with non-Communist labor organizations.

for 
JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
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
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